

Design matters

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Design matters: Tensions between democratic quality and productive collaboration

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ABSTRACT

In response to increasing democratic disenchantment, and the risk of losing legitimacy, many local governments are experimenting with new, innovative forms of citizen involvement. This is also the case in the Danish non-profit public housing sector, which is currently experiencing declining resident participation in a formerly highly well organized and successful form of democratic resident organization. As a result of this decline in resident participation, elected board members have become isolated, and the lack of input from local residents in terms of ideas, knowledge and political support has reduced the boards' ability to make political decisions that respond to the residents' problems and needs. Theories of collaborative governance propose that the introduction of interactive forms of democracy and policy-making that bring politicians and residents together may offer promising means to engage citizens and enhance the quality of democratic decision-making. This article presents the results of a case study of two local housing associations that are experimenting with innovative forms of democracy through different designs. One housing association has an open access design and the other one a restricted access design. The article studies how the two different innovative democratic designs affect collaboration between residents and their political representatives. Based on a combination of interviews, observations and documents, the case study shows that innovative democratic designs strengthens the quality of political decisions and relations between residents and political representatives. Surprisingly, the case study also finds that the open access design features greater secrecy than the restricted access design.

Key words: Democratic innovation, local government, collaborative policy innovation, collaborative governance, institutional design.

Introduction

Democratic disenchantment is increasing (Norris, 2011; Pitkin, 2004; Smith, 2009; Stoker, 2006), as evidenced by declining party membership and voter turnout and increasing distrust in elected governments in most Western countries, not least at the local government level (Pitkin, 2004). Representative democracy has undeniably been a tremendous success (Sørensen and Torfing, 2019); there have never been as many countries with representative democracy as at present, giving larger numbers of citizens the power to elect their political representatives and to hold them accountable on Election Day (Warren, 2002). On the other hand, despite these growing opportunities for influence, traditional representative democracy is also facing severe challenges as the connection between politicians and citizens is thinning, thereby reducing the ability of politicians to represent the people (Smith, 2009). Political parties have very few

members and the political representatives have sparse communication with their voters between elections. Large mass-media corporations that treat politics as entertainment govern public debate, and focusses on dramatic events and conflicts between individuals. There are hardly any spaces for deliberation between political leaders and their followers, which tends to spur the development of mutual mistrust between the leaders and the led.

In response to growing democratic disenchantment, many local governments are experimenting with innovative forms of democracy aimed at engaging citizens more actively and directly in policymaking by building platforms and arenas that facilitate politician–citizen interaction. I study the impact of innovative democratic designs on the collaboration between citizens and their political representatives. Overall, the article can be placed in the literature concerning collaborative governance aimed at solving complex problems (Ansell and Gash, 2018; Ansell and Torfing, 2015; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Torfing and Ansell, 2017). Furthermore, the article studies experiments with collaborative governance with focus on innovative democratic designs (Fung, 2006; Geissel and Newton, 2012; Michels, 2012; Smith, 2009). In times marked by growing disenchantment with the democratic institutions of representative government, this article contributes to the literature by producing empirical evidence of local governments involving citizens in policymaking that affects their own lives.

The development of democratic disenchantment and difficulties in solving a growing number of complex problems has spread to the Danish housing associations. Two such associations have launched experiments with collaborative policy forums that they denote *task groups*. These housing associations are selected because they are first movers aiming to improve the conditions for local democracy and collaboration between residents and political representatives. The housing associations pose two different contexts for studying innovative democratic designs, prompting me to ask the following research question: How do innovative democratic designs affect the collaboration between residents and their political representatives? A sub-question upon which I will also focus is how the design of collaborative policy forums accommodates democratic political representation by improving the relationships and interactions between politicians and residents. Here, tension might be rising between the broader inclusion of ideas and difficulties in reaching a common understanding. The housing associations offer different contexts in that the one housing association has designed the task group with open access for everyone, whereas the other has designed the task group with restricted access for selected participants. This distinction between the two cases presents an interesting opportunity to study the impact of how collaboration has been designed differently. When studying the innovative democratic designs, I focus on three classical norms of democracy—participation, deliberation and transparency—while also examining possible tensions relating to the innovative democratic designs and how these tensions affect the collaboration between the residents and their political representatives. To study the resident–political representative collaboration, I will focus on the process and outcome of the collaboration, from which I can also assess the democratic quality of the collaboration.

The local housing associations are experimenting with interesting democratic innovations linking traditional institutions of representative democracy with collaborative arenas in which residents and their political representatives engage in joint problem solving. By studying such

innovations, we can learn more about the role of institutional design in processes of democratic renewal aimed at spurring collaborative policymaking.

The article is structured as follows. First, I develop a theoretical framework for studying and analyzing the innovative democratic designs with particular emphasis on the tensions related to the democratic norms of participation, deliberation and transparency. Second, I introduce the housing associations, their traditional representative democracy model and their new task groups. I explain the case selection and describe the data collection methods. Third, I turn to an analysis of the two contexts of innovative democratic designs. The conclusion presents the main findings on how innovative democratic designs condition efforts to cope with key democratic challenges in Danish housing associations as well as in representative democracy more broadly.

Theoretical Framework

In recent decades, collaborative governance has been seen as a tool for developing new ideas, spurring joint learning and creating shared ownership of new solutions to *wicked problems* (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012). There is broad agreement in collaborative governance research that there is massive potential to be reaped from involving citizens in the productive collaboration of policymaking and complex problem-solving (Ansell, 2015; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Smith, 2009). The literature has primarily focused on how administrators can solve increasingly complex problems by involving and gaining input from affected citizens and relevant stakeholders (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Osborne, Radnor and Strokosch, 2016). New research shows that collaborative governance can also solve challenges for local politicians missing input and legitimacy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). I use the following definition of collaborative governance:

[A]s the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18).

As Emerson and Nabatchi underline, the focus of collaborative governance is exactly on engaging relevant actors in policy decision-making across potential borders to solve problems and create value. What makes the collaboration productive is emphasized in both its process and results; a fruitful process in which actors feel engaged, heard, seen, included and able to influence the decisions, which also produces an actual outcome.

Another focus within collaborative governance is the role of the political leaders. The portrayal of political leaders in classical leadership theory as “elected kings” (Sørensen, 2006) with sovereign power is long gone. The image of government is challenged by the rise of interactive and collaborative forms of governance. The surge of governance is prompted by the growing complexity of the challenges facing Western societies (Torfing et al., 2012). The increased use of governance networks means that increasing numbers of policy decisions are made in arenas with relevant actors in cross-border collaborations in order to solve common challenges. To give the politicians opportunity to reap the fruits of collaborative governance, it is

necessary to design innovative democratic arenas in which politicians can engage in problem-solving with relevant and affected actors (Skelcher and Torfing, 2010; Sørensen and Torfing, 2018; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). Local politicians can use the collaborative governance in new arenas to strengthen their political leadership by defining societal problems and challenges, developing new solutions and mobilizing support (Tucker, 1995).

Innovative Democratic Design

Relevant arenas composed of affected actors do not simply arise spontaneously when needed. When constructing such arenas, institutional design based on crucial choices is necessary and requires careful institutional planning and design (Egeberg and Trondal, 2018; Torfing et al., 2012). Several strands of new institutional theory (Peters, 2012) structure and routinize practices relating to forums in several ways. Institutional design expands the concept of new institutionalism. I use the definition:

[...] the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behavior and action so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks (Alexander, 2005, p. 213).

In practice, institutional design choices concerning task group policymaking revolve around choosing the theme, participants, frequency of meetings and mandate of the group. Innovative democratic designs disrupt old designs by offering new ways of organizing democratic decision-making processes. Innovative democratic designs are not necessarily a previously unseen innovation, as they will often be a new design that has been adopted and adapted from another setting. When constructing innovative democratic designs, several democratic norms must be considered. The overall choice becomes when deciding to introduce collaborative policy arenas that combine notions of new participatory and deliberative democracy with established, traditional models of representative democracy. The result becomes a hybrid form of democracy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2019). When constructing innovative democratic designs, it is possible to meddle with several democratic norms and to assess the democratic designs in various ways. The focus in this study is on three democratic norms—participation, deliberation and transparency—which are chosen because they represent crucial parts of a democratic process. I have chosen these three norms as a sum of the existing democratic literature, as they cover much of the broad previous literature on democratic evaluations (Dahl, 1989a; Geissel and Joas, 2013; Michels, 2011; Smith, 2009). In the following section, I will present each of the three democratic norms and describe some of the possible democratic tensions between the norms that possibly affect the productive collaboration.

Participation denotes the fact that the members of a political community are actively involved in governing their own affairs. Major aspects of participation relate to presence, the question of what it means to participate, and how this participation takes place. For instance, are people actively involved in making political decisions or do they appoint representatives to do so on their behalf? The next question is, what does it mean to represent? Do elected participants represent their population (e.g. age, sex, gender)? When designing a task group, participation can also spur questions about presence, inclusion, voice, quantity, equality and access (Geissel and Newton, 2012; Lijphart, 1997; Smith, 2009) (concerning representative bureaucracy, see Meier, 1975). These participation-related questions are important because they can help determine the

legitimacy and validity of a collaborative policy forum. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between inclusive and meaningful participation (Geissel and Newton, 2012, p. 16). Inclusive participation relates to the number of participants, the opportunities for participation and the composition of the group of participants. Meaningful participation relates to participants feeling that their participation matters and that politicians care for their input. Do the participants have influence on the decision-making process along the way, on the agenda and topics? Moreover, do they have an impact on the final solutions?

Deliberation is a communicative process whereby participants are viewed as equals and as open to having their preferences shaped and transformed (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007). Deliberation indicates collective decision-making through the participation of the actors who will be affected by decisions or by their political representatives (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 2017). The proponents of deliberative democracy highlight how one of the disorders of representative democracy concerns how citizens' preferences and opinions are rarely well thought through (Geissel and Joas, 2013). Deliberative democracy proposes deliberative procedures by which citizens reflect on their preferences and make reasoned decisions. Collaborative policy arenas can create opportunities for flexible and receptive deliberation, such as by broadening out the range of participants beyond the formal institutions of representative democracy (Sørensen, 2016). While collaborative policy arenas can create space to explore, discuss and deliberate innovative policy solutions, the arenas can also be used to sideline critical actors from key decisions and enhance the power and control of the elites (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 2017). There is agreement in the literature on deliberative democracy that deliberation involves discussion and the exchange of arguments, where individuals justify their opinions and show that they are willing to change their preferences (Michels, 2011). A deliberative process assumes that free public reasoning, equality and the inclusion of different interests build on mutual respect. Moreover, deliberative democracy scholars argue that deliberation contributes to the legitimacy of decisions (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007) and that bringing political representatives, administrators and residents together in a problem-focused deliberative process often stimulates policy innovation (Torfing, 2016).

Transparency is part of any open political decision-making process in which decision-makers can be sanctioned and held accountable for their actions (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 2017). The process transparency of a collaborative policy arena is important to keep; it refers to participants feeling that the discussions are genuine and that the collaborative process is not a cover for other deals (Ansell and Gash, 2008). There are risks of undermining transparency and accountability when introducing collaborative policy arenas, because the lines become more blurred (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 2017). Lacking transparency can lead to mistrust in the governing institutions. Another aspect of transparency is the internal information from facilitators and politicians to citizens and the external dissemination of the group's work to, for example, the rest of the organization. One method to keep the right people accountable is to let them formulate the overall mandate and ultimately make the final decision; in so doing, the political process is stored.


Processes of producing solutions to pressing problems that are both innovative and agreed upon by the included actors are not easy tasks. The process in itself inherits an overall tension between innovation and policy. Innovation grounds on a multitude of diverse inputs from

different angles, and the opposite is applicable for policy, which thrives on shared interests and similarities (Page and Kern, 2016). Some additional tensions exist between these dimensions when deciding to construct innovative democratic designs. Tension arises between deliberation and transparency because the more transparent and open the task group, the less deliberation might take place (Leirset, 2019). Conversely, less transparency can have a negative influence on a group's legitimacy. The higher the number of participants included, the more difficult it becomes for actors to understand each other's points of view. The exchange of arguments and discussions might be hindered if the participants are very similar to one another. Tension exists within deliberation and deliberative theories. On the one hand, deliberation works best when participants have different views; on the other, it is also requires that participants are open to changing their minds (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007). To limit dilemmas, there are important choices to balance and considerations to make.

The policy-related involvement of citizens outside of electoral processes can take many forms and serve different purposes (Michels, 2011; Smith, 2009). One such purpose can be to obtain opinions or votes from individuals or collectively from a group. Another can refer to the focus on the process or outcome of citizen involvement. My later analysis will focus on how the innovative democratic designs affect both the process and outcome of the collaboration between residents and political representatives. To further structure the analysis, I present the following assumptions based on the presented theoretical framework.

1. Innovative democratic designs bringing residents and their political representatives together will result in productive collaboration.
2. The degree of participation, deliberation and transparency in the democratic designs will have consequences for the collaborative process and outcome.

Figure 1: Inquiry of the article




The Local Housing Associations

Before turning to the method and data collection, I will introduce the field in question. The empirical domain of this article is the Danish non-profit public housing sector, which is currently the second most popular type of housing and comprising 20% of all dwellings in Denmark. Some 700 housing associations manage 8000 local housing departments. People can acquire a dwelling by signing up on a waiting list, and dwellings are distributed according to seniority on the list. Additionally, since 1984, the municipalities have had the right to assign

dwelling to those who are challenged when it comes to obtaining housing on market terms. Some residents have social problems (unemployment, poor health etc.), although they are far from the majority. Still, the rapid development of the sector throughout the 1960s–1980s resulted in physical deprivation and neglected areas, and the assignment of dwellings to people in need has contributed to the sector now suffering from a somewhat tarnished reputation. The sector features a long tradition of resident democracy (Hansen and Langergaard, 2017; Jensen, 1997). Resident democracy has roots in legislation, which ensures that the residents have the majority say in all decision-making boards (Almenboligloven, 2019). The institutional set-up in the housing associations follows the principals of representative democracy (Jensen, 1998). Figure 2 illustrates the formal resident democracy in a housing association. The board of representatives is the highest authority, followed by a political governing board and then the local department boards. The residents elect their political representatives for all of the decision-making boards. The hierarchal organization of housing associations means that the real power and influence is in the board of representatives and political governing board (KAB, 2016); the department-level latitude is limited.


Figure 2: Formal representative democracy in a housing association



Together with the municipalities, the public housing sector is a cornerstone in Danish local democracy. As described in the introduction, many local governments are experimenting with innovative forms of citizen involvement in response to growing democratic disenchantment and challenges to political legitimacy. Gentofte Kommune is an example of a local government that is experimenting with its democratic setups. The municipality has supplemented its representative democratic structure with ad hoc forums in which citizens, politicians and employees work together to find solutions to challenges (Sørensen and Torfing, 2019). Gentofte has inspired the public housing sector, which suffers from some of the same challenges. Two Danish housing associations have introduced task groups in order to co-create innovative solutions through interaction between residents and their political representatives. Figure 3

illustrates the traditional style of collaboration between political representatives and residents isolated from one another. The circle illustrates the new form of collaboration in which all actors collaborate in task groups.

Figure 3: Representative democracy and task groups



Some internal pressures have challenged the housing associations to consider collaboration and problem solving anew. These internal pressures have led the housing associations to introduce task groups to supplement their existing representative democracy due to growing democratic disenchantment and the need to strengthen the ability of political representatives to make decisions on a well-informed basis, thereby enabling them to meet residents' interests and needs. However, there are also external pressures besides demands about effectiveness and austerity. External pressures come from the national-level politicians who have devoted considerable attention to problem-filled housing areas. The new, so-called *ghetto list* introduced in Denmark features a number of criteria deciding whether a local housing area constitutes a ghetto. If the housing area is on this list for four consecutive years, a considerable fraction of the local dwellings must be torn down (Regeringen, 2018). This threat prompts the public housing associations to do everything they can to avoid the ghetto list. At a more general level, the housing associations are interested in staying well-organized and providing attractive housing opportunities for a broad group of residents. There is no guarantee that the creation of new collaborative policy arenas in local housing associations will meet all of these challenges, but according to the housing associations themselves and with inspiration from Gentofte, it is an experiment to help mobilize the resources and energy of the local residents. The local housing associations are examples of local governments that consist of an administration and elected political representatives. The housing associations constitute an empirical context with opportunities for comparison with local representative governments elsewhere.

Method

The housing associations included are first movers in terms of being the first Danish housing associations to have introduced collaborative policy forums of this sort. That is why the cases have been selected for this article. The housing associations are inspired by Gentofte and its successful work with *task committees* for years (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). Overall, the public housing sector provides favorable conditions for experimenting with innovative democratic designs. The favorable conditions are steady and consensus-seeking democratic set-ups focused on social capital and welfare solutions and traditions regarding public and private collaboration. However, there might also be some challenging conditions due to the demography

of the public housing sector, which is below the national average of income and education. These factors correlate negatively with active democratic participation (Scharpf, 1994). I have included two task groups from different housing associations, 3B and AL2. In the following part, I will describe each housing association to account for their context for the later analysis (Yin, 2014). The thicker descriptions of each of the associations' task groups will follow in the first part of the analysis.

The 3B housing association has its offices in Copenhagen, the Danish capital, and consists of 300 employees. There are around 12000 dwellings with more than 20000 residents (3B, n.d.-a). The task groups are part of 3B's overall organizational strategy to secure an active and attractive resident democracy (3B, 2016). 3B has made use of task groups since autumn 2016, and since then the housing association has completed a total of six task groups (3B, n.d.-b). 3B political governing board introduced the task group subject to this article. The task group was designed with restricted access design, where only invited residents could participate.

The AL2 housing association is located in Jutland, just outside Aarhus, which is Denmark's second-largest city. AL2 has 100 employees, around 5000 dwellings and more than 9000 residents (AL2bolig, n.d.). AL2 was inspired by 3B to work with task groups and has had one such group so far (AL2bolig, 2018); they are not part of the overall organizational strategy. The AL2 political governing board formed its first task group with an open-access design in which all residents were invited to participate.

The task groups included create new arenas for collaborative policymaking by letting political representatives and residents work together over a relatively brief period to solve pressing community problems. The case choice of this study is aligned with the research question of how innovative democratic designs affect collaboration. The cases are different in sameness in the sense that the housing associations have introduced innovative democratic designs with different approaches to their respective organizations. The difference-in-design creates different contexts. One task group features a restricted access design where selected residents are invited to participate. The other features an open access design where all residents are invited to participate. The presented cases pose different contexts for studying innovative democratic design in practice. Given the difference between the two task groups, one might assume that the open access design would score better regarding the democratic norms presented above in the theory section and that the collaboration would therefore be of higher democratic quality. The housing associations are relatively similar in many aspects other than the difference-in-design. They provide the same work and service and meet the same challenges. The cases are therefore similar enough to be compared. The purpose of studying different cases is to gain empirical knowledge regarding innovative democratic designs and the impact they have on the collaboration between civic and political actors. I analyse and compare the cases in terms of innovative democratic design, process and outcome. I study the context of each case separately and in comparison. In the discussion, I elaborate on the two contexts, the differences, sameness and their impact on each collaboration. The conclusions I am able to draw from this case study are based on empirical windows (Czarniawska, 1997) into a more general interaction between civic and political actors.

Although the findings from the following empirical analysis may be difficult to generalize due to the particularity of the strong, consensus-oriented democracy and high level of trust in institutions that are favorable conditions for civic engagement, and furthermore are characteristic for Danish local governments in an international context, it still may stimulate attempts to bolster local representative governments elsewhere. The possibilities for generalization to an international context vary from learnings about resident democracy, comparisons to member democratic setups, securing input on relevant matters to reach sustainable solutions and increasing social capital through involvement and engagement.

Table 1: Data

	Data from housing association with restricted access design	Data from housing association with open access design
Documents	Web page about organization, minutes from meetings in the political governing board, mandate, descriptions of task groups.	Web page about organization, minutes from meetings in the political governing board.
Observations of meetings	Task group (4), board of representatives (1), political governing board (1)	Task group (2), board of representatives (1), political governing board (1)
Interviews	Residents (3), political representatives (2), administration (3)	Residents (2), political representatives (3), administration (2)

The documents include introductions to the field of non-profit housing, official documents from the housing associations, strategies, written mandates, policy briefs and all other documents concerning the task groups. In the case of 3B, I have also included an evaluation of the task groups, which was completed by the housing association. The non-participatory observations were collected to gain insight into the task group work. I observed a couple of meetings in each case. The observations provided knowledge about the specific task groups and a sense of life in the housing association. The interviews with employees focused on the procedural framing of the task groups, while the interviews with political representatives and residents focused on the task group work. The interviews have been transcribed and coded manually. In the empirical analysis of the data, I have searched for themes relating to innovative democratic design concerning participation, deliberation and transparency. Moreover, I looked for themes concerning the collaboration between residents and their political representatives focused on both the process and outcome of the collaboration.

Analysis

To answer my question on how innovative democratic designs affect the collaboration between residents and their political representatives, the analysis is structured as follows. First, I study the task groups' innovative democratic designs in practice. Second, I study the impact of

the designs on the process and outcome of the collaboration between residents and political representatives, which will help me to detect the democratic quality of the task groups.

Innovative Democratic Design: The Restricted Access Group

The empirical study shows how the housing association has relatively clear procedures and rules for forming and constructing new task groups. They use a standardized template when a new task group is established and introduced to the organization. The political governing board then formulates a written mandate for each new task group. The mandates are all accessible on the housing association website, where a designated website has been made for the task groups. The website also includes information and updates about the work in the task groups, and the group's final product can be found on the website when the group is terminated (3B, 2019). There seems to be political support for the task groups from the organization.

To improve budgets and efficiency, the housing association recently decided to join a shared administrative service with another public housing association in Copenhagen. The housing association continues on its own to govern and maintain its dwellings, but the two organizations now share some of the service functions offered to the residents and the local housing departments. This merger has triggered many concerns among the residents. The task group studied in this article was mandated to consider how the relation between the new-shared administrative service and the local housing boards and residents could be improved for both the organizations and communications in order to secure and strengthen local democracy and resident services. The task group decided during their process to do a handbook about the merger with the other housing association. The handbook answers some of the biggest concerns from the residents, displays new opportunities for the residents in the merger, clarifies the role of the local housing boards, and establishes a transparent procedure for getting on the waiting list for a new dwelling.

Two members of the political governing board, two additional political representatives and an administrative facilitator were appointed to the group. The resident members were individually invited to participate in the task group. The housing association also has an interest list on their website for residents to sign up for future task groups. However, the housing association quickly learned that those who registered on the website tended to be the "the usual suspects;" persons who were already involved in other democratic activities. As the head of the secretariat explains:

Who is recruited to the task group is important – both in relation to interests and competences and to attempt to maintain some degree of control.

As another manager explains:

We try to appoint residents we believe are particularly suited to solve this particular task. That is no secret.

The task group held four relatively informal meetings consisting of a combination of short presentations from employees giving guest speeches, brainstorming, group work and joint discussions. During the first couple of meetings, the group focused on finding common ground

for concrete problem solving. The focus later shifted to producing clear results and recommendations for presentation to the political governing board.

Innovative Democratic Design: The Open Access Group

The empirical analysis reflects how working with this task group format remains relatively new for the housing association. The task group appear to enjoy political support from the organization. However, there is no accessible mandate describing the task groups. The housing association has a designated website on their website, where only limited information about the task groups can be found.

Due to complaints from residents because of construction and repair work, a task group was created to discuss communication and the roles between external firms and the housing associations when such work was to take place. The task group was first asked to make policy recommendations to the political governing board concerning this matter and to create some kind of deliverable (e.g. a pamphlet). The administrative facilitator describes how, during the process, the political governing board's request of the task group changed so that only a recommendations for a new communication policy was required, which annoyed some of the residents.

Two members of the political governing board and two administrative facilitators were appointed to the group. The resident members were invited via a broad invitation to all the housing association residents. The invitation was posted on the website and at a Board of Representatives meeting, where all the democratically active residents are present. The task group held four relatively informal meetings, which were a combination of short presentations from employees and guest speakers, brainstorming, group work and joint discussions. At the first meeting, 30 residents showed up. The facilitator explains: "The invitation was imprecise, and many people had misunderstood the point of the meeting."

Many residents thought that it was an information meeting about the possible renovation of their dwellings. The meeting did not go as planned. For the most part, people just voiced their negative experiences and complaints, which was not particularly conducive to innovative policymaking. Although it is possible that some frustrated residents might have gotten some things off their chest. The number of participants declined after that first meeting, and less than one-third of those from the first meeting remained in the group, which ended up consisting of around seven participants. During the later meetings, the group became clearer about their task, which was providing input to policy recommendations to the board.

Design Impact on Collaboration: The Restricted Access Group

My observations and interviews reveal a high level of engagement from the local residents, who take pride in participating actively in the process. Access was clearly restricted in this task group, which limits transparency to some degree in that only the invited participants know what happen at the task group meetings. However, the task group did regularly update their website describing their work. The facilitator made a big deal of ensuring procedural transparency. The participants were introduced to the task group's mandate at the first meeting, where the work format was also presented. The first meeting began with a preliminary brainstorming session on the overall topic to secure and strengthen local democracy and services for residents. One resident left the task group after the first meeting because she felt the

brainstorming process was far too rushed. It made her feel like the work schedule was too tight and that the political leaders and the administrator steered the process too much. Despite losing her, the other participants all agreed that the final policy recommendations contained new ideas that would not have been taken in if it had not been for the work of the task group.

In the later stages of the process, participants were involved in refining the final product and making new suggestions, a process that took place at the last task group meeting and via follow-up emails, which was a very transparent process that rendered it possible for everyone to see who had made which changes to the material. Besides disseminating the task group's work on their website, different task group participants shared their experiences at Board of Representatives meetings and on other relevant occasions.

Over the course of the process, the participants were all welcome to express opinions regardless of their position in the organization hierarchy. One resident explains how the discussions stimulated learning in the process:

Participating in the task group gave me opportunity to express my opinion and to raise critical concerns. I also listened to the other participants, who had other concerns and worries – to compare my own concerns with theirs. The discussions helped me see things in a different light and to think a little broader about the problems and solutions. At one point, we had too many balls in the air, but we managed to draw things together in the end, which was good.

Other residents mentioned how the administrative facilitator insisted on following the overall rules and principles of the task group format, which might have held back the innovation process slightly. The group ultimately produced a new handbook with all of the relevant service information, including a transparent procedure for getting on the waiting list for a new dwelling. The policy recommendations were later accepted and implemented in the organization by the political governing board. The board completed the process by thanking the participants and expressing appreciation for their work. The participating residents responded by sharing how much they had enjoyed participating and how proud they were of the results of the group.

The process of the task group has been transparent and open towards the rest of the organization. Despite the access being restricted, the participation was meaningful. The participants have all been discussing, giving inputs and expressing opinions. The residents were satisfied with participating in the task group, and they explain how they were honored to be a part of the group, which might have encouraged them to contribute even more. The outcome of the task groups were solutions secured through the active involvement and problem-focused policy deliberations between the residents and their political representatives. The use of collaborative policy arenas has strengthened the relations in the organization by improving participation, which contributed to new and better policy solutions. Past task groups have motivated new residents to play a more active role in the local resident democracy. The general attitude among the participants was that the solutions emerging from the task group were more improvements than radical innovations, per se. However, all of the participants also found the ideas and solutions to be new compared to what the political and administrative leaders had been able to come up with.

Design Impact on Collaboration: The Open Access Group

The task group with open access design had a difficult start. The undefined agenda made for a rather chaotic first meeting, which possibly also affected the process and meetings that followed. The unclear agenda and lacking explanation of the background for the task group made it difficult for the residents to know in what they were agreeing to participate. The first meeting was spent trying to explain the topic of the meeting, which did not go so well. One resident explained:

Many people came to complain about everyday things and not about the renovation, which was the set topic. The administrator had to keep ‘putting out fires’, and we spent the first meeting just getting on track with what this was all about.

The importance of defining a clear agenda is quite familiar in the network management literature, where a missing mandate and clear description can underline how uncertain networks can be to manage (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). A written mandate can also limit the dilemma of broader inclusion of ideas versus difficulties in reaching a common understanding, because there is created an overall direction for the discussions. Aside from the many and broad discussions and complaints about various things in the first meeting, the subsequent meetings were not particularly deliberative. One resident describes the group as “being too much in agreement” and that “there was not enough discussion”. This tendency to agree might have been because the participants in the task group were much alike and therefore neither discussed nor exchanged views. This might also have been the facilitator’s influence. Because of the chaotic first meeting, the administrator might have felt it necessary to steer the group even more. Furthermore, the administrative facilitator explained how it was difficult not to intervene in the process. She was responsible for developing the recommendations into later strategies, so she could not help but think about that.

Access was open in the task group, meaning that all residents were invited to participate, suggesting a thoroughly transparent design. Despite this openness, the housing association disseminated very little about the task group to the rest of the organization. The administrative facilitator explains that the organization had promoted it poorly. One resident describes how there should have been much more information before, during and after the task group meetings. The group did ultimately produce some policy recommendations to the political governing board. As one resident describes:

We have not reinvented the wheel, but we did get some things on the table that I am not sure would have been included otherwise.

Other residents mention how there seemed to be some case management during the meetings and between the meetings whereby the administration made some decisions without involving the group. That held the innovation process back a bit and eroded the trust within the group.

The task group has to some degree helped legitimize the political solutions for the political representatives but due to the limited deliberations and steered process, the process did not have actual collaboration. Despite the open access, the task group is surprisingly opaque

concerning procedural transparency and dissemination. While the involvement was not as active and deliberative as it could have been, the remaining participants enjoyed being part of the group, albeit they would have liked more guidance and information about the process for it to be more collaborative. The following table sums up the democratic norms of the two task groups.

Table 2: Innovative Democratic Design

	Restricted access design	Open access design
Participation		
Inclusive and meaningful participation	Not inclusive, but meaningful participation	Inclusive, but not meaningful participation
Deliberation		
Discussion and exchange of arguments	A lot of deliberation	Not much deliberation
Transparency		
Transparent procedures and dissemination to the rest of the organization	Very transparent	Not transparent

Comparison

In comparing the presented cases, I will first focus on their designs and afterwards on the dimensions of process and outcome as presented in figure 1. Both housing associations describe themselves as having a: “unilateral resident democracy with the same type of residents participating.” Here, unilateral refers to the fact that young people, minorities and people with children are not represented in the democratic organs. Positions are traditionally occupied for a long time in the formal decision-making arenas and boards. The meetings are usually held in the evening or on weekends. The housing associations have been seeking new ways to include residents in policy innovation and to gather opinions on pressing challenges. As part of their organizational strategies, both housing associations were committed to strengthening resident democracy, and a task group structure seemed to fit this goal. The collaborative policymaking for both task groups still commences and ends in the political governing board, which forms and determines the mandate for the task groups and discusses, amends and adopts the policy proposals from the continuous dialogue with the participating actors. In so doing, the importance of politics and the opportunity to hold political representatives accountable for policymaking on election day is kept (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). The two designs differ in their openness concerning both accessibility and transparency. Another relevant difference is that only the group with restricted access has a written mandate describing the task groups and their overall missions. The two designs have affected the process and outcome of the collaboration between residents and political representatives differently.

The process of the open access design provides conditions for the innovative policymaking that are neither particularly transparent nor deliberative. The group might also suffer from self-selection challenges regarding the participation. The first meeting in the open group was unsuccessful, which might have discouraged some residents from participating. Tension between deliberation and transparency developed in the open group, where the openness

of the group ultimately hindered the deliberations and transparency. The open access design might at first glance seem more democratic and of more democratic quality, because of the inclusion of all residents. However, the design actually ends up creating tensions between its democratic norms constraining the productive collaboration between residents and political representatives. The process of the task group appears more like a consultation than an actual collaboration.

The process of the restricted access design delivers conditions for innovative policy-making that are not inclusive to everyone, but otherwise transparent and deliberative in its format. The process in the restricted group was more discussion-friendly and engaging than in the open group. In addition, because they were handpicked, the residents in the restricted group might have been more resourceful and fit for the task. Both groups seem somewhat over-controlled by their administrative facilitators, which possibly restricted the innovative discussions. Still, both task groups clearly provided outcome in the form of qualified solutions to pressing problems to each of their organizations. Furthermore, according to residents in both task groups, the outcome and the final policy recommendations contained new ideas and solutions that would not have come up if it had not been for the work in the task group. Both task groups appear to have had a positive impact on the relationship between residents and their political representatives. In the housing association with the restricted design, new residents actually wanted to join the traditional democratic set-up. In both groups, the residents and political representatives have developed a better understanding of each other's views and opinions after spending time together and solving concrete challenges that they shared in common; however, it is unclear how much collaboration actually took place in the open access group, where the process seemed more like a consultation than an actual collaboration.

Discussion

There are no guarantees that innovative democratic designs will lead to solutions that completely cure democratic disenchantment and political illegitimacy; however, there are several interesting analytical discoveries concerning the collaboration that I will discuss in the following section. Before discussing the analytical findings, I will first reflect on the format of the two innovative democratic designs. The task groups incorporate elements from participatory and deliberative democracy within a traditional model of representative democracy. The housing association with the restricted access design has more experience with task groups, and they have inspired the housing association with the open access design to experiment with this work form. The housing association with the restricted design has experienced several new residents wanting to join local activities and contributing to the resident democracy after having participated in a task group. Despite innovative democratic designs, disrupting traditional models, transparency is maintained by the fact that the political governing board initiates and mandates the task groups and has the final decision on adopting their policy recommendations. Turning to comparing the two different innovative democratic designs of the task groups, the overall outcomes of the groups are positive.

The most surprising finding concerns the opaqueness of the open access design, which seems to attract the “the usual suspects,” who are those who frequently participate in local

activities and are possibly active in other local political governing boards too. The self-selection creates some measure of homogeneity in the group, where the self-selection bias limits the deliberation and differences between the participants. Nevertheless, selection bias also occurs in the group with restricted access. Here, the invited participants are chosen because they fit the group well and because the housing association wants to maintain some degree of control. Both designs exclude weak and minority groups. To include minority groups can also be difficult due to unrepresentative bureaucracy, where there are no representatives in the administration or the political top to represent minority groups (Meier, 1975).

The housing association with the restricted access design has accumulated more experience with task groups, which might help to explain the respective design of the two groups. The housing association has gained positive knowledge on how to recruit participants and experienced the value of having a written mandate to set out direction for the group. Formulating a well-described written mandate for each task group, which is presented to the participants together with a joint discussion of outlooks and interests, can help to get everyone on the same page and to harmonize expectations.

Both cases show that innovative democratic design strengthens the quality of political decisions and the relations between residents and political representatives. Both cases also show that the solutions in question would not have emerged without the task group and that the relations between residents and their political representatives have been strengthened. That might to some degree answer the question of whether it is possible to cure the ills of local representative democracy through innovative democratic designs. Despite the good intentions in both housing associations, organizational structures still do not entirely support the task groups. It remains difficult for the housing associations to reach young residents and minorities, which might have something to do with the traditions for when and where the meetings have been held. The political representatives from the political governing board receive a fee to attend the traditional committee meetings. They do not receive a fee to attend the task groups meetings, which might create an imbalance, especially if the housing associations wish to expand the task group work in their organization, and want to signal that the task groups are work forms that can supplement the traditional democratic set-up. Possible tensions between the representative political boards and the particular task groups can be dealt with through a written mandate. Furthermore, the political representatives must find a balance with respect to having insight into what the task group is working on while at the same time not undermining the group's work by setting out a new course or changing criteria. The political board is responsible for monitoring the self-regulation of the task groups, which they can do via the written mandate and by providing brief, succinct feedback to the task groups.

Concluding Remarks and Ways Ahead

Concluding this article, I will return to the research question and the two assumptions. The research question asks how innovative democratic designs affect collaboration between residents and their political representatives. The assumptions state that (1) innovative democratic designs bringing residents and their political representatives together will result in productive collaboration and that (2) the degree of participation, deliberation and transparency in the

democratic designs will have consequences for the collaborative process and outcome. Based on the presented analyses, I can confirm both assumptions for both cases. In the following, I will elaborate on this, as there is need for a more nuanced conclusion.

This article has studied examples of innovative democratic designs in the Danish public housing sector that have been introduced due to challenges to democracy and political legitimacy. The innovative democratic designs introduced collaborative policy arenas, where affected residents have been mobilized and become an active resource in defining pressing policy problems and designing and implementing innovative policy solutions in practical work forums together with their political representatives.

The housing associations introduce a new kind of innovative democratic design through the integration of elements from participatory and deliberative democracy into the traditional model of representative democracy, which creates a type of hybrid democracy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). This hybrid democracy brings residents together with their political representatives to discuss pressing problems and ambitions for policy solutions.

The task group with open access design result in somewhat productive collaboration between the residents and their political representatives. The degree of participation, deliberation and transparency has some consequences for the collaborative process and outcome. The process of the group becomes more like a consultation, where inputs from the residents were secured to legitimize a political decision, than a collaboration. However, the outcome of the group was something that both residents and political representatives were satisfied with. The design of the open access group does not make the actors feel as heard, seen and included, as in the restricted access group. The open access task group has less meaningful participation, less deliberation and less transparency than the restricted access task group. The task group with the restricted access design has a productive collaboration between residents and their political representatives. The chosen residents feel heard and seen in the process and all participants are very proud of the outcome of the group. The two different innovative democratic designs are both contributing with something in each of their context.

In conclusion, the design matters for innovative democratic designs. The design has impact on the process, outcome and democratic quality of the collaboration. The cases show that, when constructing innovative democratic designs, there lies a significant consideration in balancing openness and restriction, as different designs pose different tensions between democratic quality and productive collaboration.

The relatively successful adaption of innovative democratic designs in both housing associations reveals great potential in other kinds of representative settings in local governments. However, I must also acknowledge the limitations of my study. I have only analyzed the designs and collaboration of task groups in two housing associations. Limitations regarding the data include that the group with the restricted access design had more experience and might have had more basis for reflection on their own work and actions. This study only includes data from two Danish cases of collaborative policymaking, which obviously limits the ability to generalize. There are also special conditions for the housing associations to create limits regarding the transferability of the findings to the greater representative democracy. Similar cases are required

in order to determine the generic features of the tensions between democratic designs and collaborative policymaking. The public housing sector is developed in alignment with the universalistic welfare model, with a high degree of decentralization to the local level to encourage residents to take part. The housing associations in question are much alike, with similar interactions between political representatives and residents and political and administrative cultures. The culture of politics and administration is grounded in consensus and compromise with a focus on social capital and welfare solutions. The public housing sector remains below the national average of income and education, however, which might indicate that settings with higher socioeconomic factors might succeed even better when constructing innovative democratic designs. I can hope that other housing associations facing the same challenges and other sectors with similar challenges can find inspiration from these innovative democratic designs.

To elaborate on the conclusion of this article, I want to highlight learnings about democratic innovations in the light of democratic disenchantment. The article tells a story on, how productive collaboration actually ends up costing on the democratic quality. The article finds a trade-off between the democratic norms, and the most productive collaboration concerning both process and outcome calls for restriction on democratic norms. This exploratory study has focused on the tensions between democracy and collaborative policymaking. The article has highlighted some of the tensions requiring consideration when introducing collaborative policy making arenas. Much of the literature utilized in this article does not problematize this aspect, but I stress that it is necessary to focus on it to expand the body of knowledge. Collaboration comes at a price and can require limitations or restriction to be successful. Successful collaboration also demands more of politicians. The politicians gain more input for their policymaking, but there are also growing demands to their representation of their followers. For practitioners, there might be valuable insights and considerations to be found in this study when introducing innovative democratic designs to an organization.

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